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Elite Sport Funding in the UK
Funding and the National Governing Bodies of Sport
In  2006 UKSport,  the body responsible for  funding elite  level  Olympic sports  in the UK, 
adopted the ‘no compromise’ approach to funding the National Governing Bodies of Sport 
(Green, 2009).  As part of this clear prioritisation of elite sport funding, this funding strategy 
not only targeted “resources solely at those athletes/sports that are capable of delivering 
medal winning performances” (UKSport, 2007, p.1; Green, 2009), but also enabled UKSport 
to withdraw funding from the Olympic funding cycle from those National Governing Bodies 
of Sport (NGBs) that failed to achieve performance targets.  This funding has created a new 
relationship between UKSport and the NGBs, one based on resource-dependency, where if 
the sport  achieves specific  targets they will  in  turn receive their  funding (Green,  2006). 
However,   it is virtually impossible to resist this change as NGBs have become ever more 
dependent  upon  government  resources,  which  places  them  in  an  extremely  precarious 
position – you cannot bite the hand that feeds you (Green, 2006).  So when eight Olympic 
sports failed to achieve the targets set by UKSport, their funding was cut from between 5% 
and 52% (Green, 2009).  
UKSport employed the ‘No Compromise’ funding strategy as the rationale for these funding 
reductions, but not all the NGBs felt the process was transparent as several they felt had 
performed  adequately.   Indeed  Richard  Callicott,  Chairman  of  the  British  Volleyball 
Federation, stated “We have made great progress and have hit all performance targets set 
us.  We are wholly unable to understand UKSport thinking, that... they should turn round 
and give us less money than they had originally planned to.” (BBC, 2009).  Secondly, several 
had actually exceeded their performance targets (See table 1).  Fencing and weightlifting 
exceeded their medal targets, and three of the other NGBs did not have any targets as they 
were seen as ‘development sports’.  What makes this process even less transparent is that 
several  other  NGBs  did  not achieve  their  medal  targets  but  still  saw  an  increase  their 
funding - archery saw a 55.5% increase in their funding, even though they did not achieve 
their  targets  (UKSport,  2009;  UKSport,  2010).   Most  of  these  organisations  could  not 
understand why their funding had been reduced by so much, when other less established 
sports (basketball and synchronised swimming for example) had seen massive increases in 
funding.  Even with a £1.8m donation from Sport Aid’s talented athlete scheme, many of 
these NGBS simply  could not see how they would be able to afford to compete at  the 
London 2012 games.
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Table 1: London 2012 London Funding compared to Beijing
Sport Targets 
achieved?
Funding for 
Beijing 2008 (£m)
Revised Funding for 
London 2012 (£m)
% Change 
in funding
Archery No 2.83 4.4 +55.5
Diving No 5.87 6.52 +11.1
Equestrian No 11.72 13.38 +14.1
Fencing* Yes 3.07 2.51 -18 .0
Handball* N/A 2.99 2.89 -3.0
Judo No 6.94 7.48 +7.7
Shooting* No 5.06 2.45 -51.5
Table tennis* No 2.53 1.21 -52.3
Triathlon No 5.11 5.28 +3.4
Volleyball (inc beach)* N/A 4.11 3.51 -14.7
Water polo* N/A 3.5 2.90 -7.8
Weightlifting* Yes 1.68 1.36 -19.3
Wrestling* No 2.13 1.43 -32.5
*National Governing Body that received “basic levels of funding”
(Shaded sports received a funding increase)
Source: (www.UKSport.gov.uk)
Funding and New Public Management
The changes to the funding mechanism, elite sports policy and the governance of NGBs have 
clearly been influenced by the concepts and principles of ‘New Public Management’.  NPM 
seeks to place greater  emphasis  on managerial  improvement within the NGBs by giving 
them greater autonomy through a decentralised approach, but in return UKSport  requires 
the NGBs to become more efficient  and responsive by using market approaches (Hood, 
1995).  This approach has been described as a ‘good managerial approach’ as it is more 
results  orientated  (efficiency,  effectiveness,  service  quality)  and  places  higher  levels  of 
accountability  on  the  NGBs  that  receive  funding  (Hood,  1991;  Holmes  &  Shand,  1995; 
Robinson, 2004; Coalter, 2007).  This accountability was measured by UKSport through its 
fundamental  measure of ‘good management’ the winning of Olympic medals.  With this 
‘simplified’ measure of performance now in place, a key criticism of NPM becomes apparent 
as  the NGBs face more complex objectives,  more intricate accountabilities,  but  lack the 
degree of  freedom that  many market  based organisations  have (Singh,  2003;  Mongkol, 
2011).  While this approach will  seek to generate greater autonomy within the NGBs, in 
terms of how they respond to this changes in funding, this increased freedom may actually 
result  in  responses  that  favour  certain  groups  and is  detrimental  to  others  (Ormond & 
Loffler,  2006;  Mongkol,  2011).   Clearly,  there  will  be  a  need  for  effective  governance 
systems to ensure that any new strategy that is implemented can be monitored to ensure 
benefits to the NGBs and all  its members,  not just  those groups that can exert political 
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power  to  ensure  their  own  personal/career  goals  remain  legitimised  (Mintzberg,  1985; 
Buchanan & Bradham, 1999; Hoye, 2006; Mason et al, 2006).
In  order  to  move  in  a  new  strategic  direction  and  to  meet  the  challenges  of  ‘no 
compromise’, the NGBs need to ensure that the strategy is not only harmonious with their 
stakeholders interests, but meets also their responsibilities to central government (Kikulis, 
2000; Forster, 2006).  However, Painter (1997,p. 42) has argued that "most areas of public 
service  and  administration  have  distinct  political,  ethical,  constitutional  and  social 
dimensions" that render it different from the private sector.  Indeed,  an argument can be 
made that NPM may not be applicable to public sector organisations, nor should it be seen 
as  a  superior  benchmark  for  NGBs  as  their managers  will  have  to  deliver  ‘non-market’ 
objectives (Alford, 1997; Painter, 1997).  With a loss of accountability and  what Minogue 
(2000) defines as a ‘democratic deficit’, if NGBs do not implement a governance system that 
can monitor their new strategy and control their new strategic direction, they may see a 
further  reduction in  funding  through the intervention  of  UKSport,  as  well  as  come into 
conflict  with  their  stakeholders (Freeman,  1984;  Pajunen,  2006;  UKSport,  2004;  UKSport 
2007; King, 2009).  
Research objectives
This research paper will seek to achieve the following two research objectives:-
• To  determine  the  impacts  of  the  funding  decisions  on  the  NGBs  that  received 
significant reductions in funding.
• To  examine  how  UKSport  use  the  ‘no  compromise’  funding  regime  to  exert 
managerial control over NGBs
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Key Literature for Study
Power relations in the change process
With the creation of  'No compromise', and the movement towards a funding mechanism 
that is based on statistical evidence (world rankings) and tangible outputs (medals), UKSport 
are seeking to control the discourse as to the meaning/mission of the NGBs and their role in 
society.  Power is being exerted on the NGBs by UKsport  by  seeking to control outcomes 
(Amis  et al, 2004).  However, this over reliance on statistical evidence on ‘success’ could 
become problematic for UKSport because as they seek to create and control the discourse 
that surrounds elite sport,  it  will  at  the same time narrow actors understanding of elite 
sport in certain ways (Piggin et al, 2009).  This clearly highlights the problem for UKSport, for 
in  their  desire  to  control  the  meaning  of  elite  sport  in  the  UK  through  the  NGBs 
performance, it also creates  a clearer  path to criticism (Piggin  et al, 2009).  By creating a 
funding model that is based on positivistic, objective measures of performance, UKSport are 
seeking to not only rationalise their funding decisions, but to also exert power over the 
NGBs in terms of  marginalising certain knowledge assumptions,  and to legitimise a new 
discourse.
Through an investigation of the power relationship between the NGBs and UKSport, and an 
analysis  of  the  internal  relations  within  the  NGBs,  research  can  explain  the  actions  of 
individuals/groups by giving reasons and in turn give a detailed explanation of those actions 
(Dowding,  2006).  If  research  (Alvesson  &  Deetz,  2000;  Frisby,  2005)  is  correct  in  its 
assumption that any decisions that are made, in terms of UKSport funding allocations or the 
NGBs response to this allocation, in the long run serve those in positions of power then 
clearly this move to greater levels of performance (medals) must be seen as being beneficial 
to these individuals/groups power.  Using a critical approach, we can seek to understand 
and address the perceived inequalities in the funding allocations by empowering the actors 
involved  to  make  sense  and  understand  what  is  happening  around  them  (Kincheloe  & 
McLaren, 1998).  
Governance and ‘No Compromise’
While there is a variety of literature within the field of ‘governance’ per se, there is little 
that  has  been  applied  to  strategy  formulation  within  the  Sport  NGBs  (Forster,  2006). 
Governance issues will come to the fore when the NGBs go through a change process, and 
need to effectively manage the change if it is to be effective.  With the NGBs working with 
reduced levels of income what  constitutes an  appropriate  form of governance has been 
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questioned.  Clearly, the NGBs will be experiencing increased pressure to increase revenue 
generation, attract higher membership numbers and produce world class athletes, while at 
the same time adopt a ‘business’ model of operations to prevent further reductions in their 
funding  allocation  (Deem,  1991; Hoye  &  Auld,  2001;  Hoye,  2006;  Ferkins,  Shilbury  & 
McDonald, 2009).  Governance has therefore become a critical component of the effective 
management of sport organisations, particularly those funded by central government (Hoye, 
2006; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Houlihan & Green, 2009).
Key models of governance (Principal-Agency Theory)
Through the measures that are being imposed on the NGBs (No Compromise, Competence 
Framework) UKSport are focusing their 'power' in order exert control,  so that ultimately 
NGBs act in a manner that is intrinsically linked to their own aims and objectives (Chalip, 
1996).    While UKSport have the clear goal of achieving the maximum amount of medals 
from  their  investment,  the  NGBs  interests  and  viewpoints  are  varied  as  they  have  to 
contend  with  multiple  stakeholders  (amateur  and  elite  athletes,  coaches,  sponsors, 
volunteers, board members).  It is apparent that these methods of 'constraint' have been 
adopted so that the NGBs (the agent) act in the interests of UKSport (the principal) rather 
than  their  own  -  a  key  tenet  of  Principal-Agent  Theory  of  governance.    Spear  (2004) 
identifies  key  external  factors  such  as  government  influence  and  the  drive  towards 
professionalization of  managers (as  can be seen through UKSport's  NPM agenda)  tilting 
power towards the managers, out of the hands of stakeholders.  Spear (2004) goes on to 
state  that  this  model  of  governance,  ignores  individual  members,  due  to  performance 
measures placed on them and marginalises “collective, social or organizational factors … it 
tends  to  ignore  non-financial  motivations  such  as  common  values,  shared  benefits  and 
trust.” (p.50).  Walters, Tacon & Trenberth (2010) argue that NGBs need to become much 
better at identification of their stakeholders and go onto to state "All NGBs should bring key 
stakeholders to the board/committee to improve stakeholder representation" (p.6).  With 
UKSport ‘coercing’ NGBs to act in a performance orientated manner, there is little incentive 
to engage in this process, and stakeholders will probably continue to be marginalised.
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Initial Results and Discussion
In-depth interviews were conducted with two current chief executives of Olympic NGBs. 
The subjects were selected through purposive sampling which enabled the researcher to 
select organisations that had received significant reductions in funding and had experienced 
negative consequences as a result (Babbie, 1990).  Although this means that the selection of 
the interviewees group was subject to personal bias of the researcher, it did enable the 
research to select the cases based on their potential to supply specialist knowledge relevant 
to  the  research  aim  and  objectives  (Saunders,  Lewis  and  Thornhill,  2009).   With  the 
researcher specifically looking at NGBs that have received a funding reduction, the following 
NGBs and their CEO’s were selected for the focus group:-
• British Table Tennis Federation (52.3%reduction in funding)
• British Fencing (18% reduction in funding)
The Impacts of the funding reduction
With UKSport adopting the ‘no compromise’ funding model, the NGBs have had to change 
their  daily  operations and structure.   This  point is  further reinforced by several  authors 
(Kikulis,  2000; Forster,  2006;  Green,  2009),  who argue there are  a  number of  structure 
related issues surrounding NGBs when their funding is focused on their performance such as 
the introduction of new teams or professional staff and a concentration of funding towards 
athletes who will hit performance targets now, rather than in the future.  Consequently, the 
respondents  felt  the  funding  decisions  have impacted  upon not  only  the  organisational 
structure of their NGB, but also upon its culture and mind set (Augestead et al, 2006).  Both 
respondents were of a similar view that performance had to be rewarded, but there also 
needed to be investment:-
“Well I understand the model perfectly and the ruthless ‘no compromise’ approach to  
high performance is right.  You don’t dilute excellence.  However, the issue with it is that  
at some point there has to be an element of investment in a programme as opposed to  
purely rewarding a programme.  Where will long term investment come from?”
 
When  analysing  the  responses  provided  by  the  interviews  to  the  impact  of  the  ‘no 
compromise’ funding model, it can be argued they are the result of the participating NGBs 
being forced to adopt a more professional approach to their activities.  This has resulted in 
the NGBs aligning themselves more closely with the private sector as opposed to remaining 
closely aligned with the voluntary sector. Consequently, based on the data collected for this 
research, different values are now emerging within sporting NGBs (Wiscombe, 2009).  This 
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change in culture influences the values and beliefs of the organisation, its daily operations 
and arguably the traditional  perceived role of NGBs within UK sport  (Deloitte & Touche 
2003; Houlihan & Green, 2009).  
“If  funding is  going to  be linked more and more  to  performance  and  
medals, then the elite guys need to be supported.  It’s incredibly tough to  
win medals – that is why the focus needs to be on high performance”
As the NGBs adapt to the changes imposed on them by their funding reductions the values, 
ideas and beliefs that underpin these organisations will come under pressure from not only 
key stakeholders within the organisations but also UKSport (Bayle & Madella, 2002; Bayle & 
Robinson, 2007; Green, 2009).  The responsibility of adopting professional practices extolled 
by  UKSport  and  a  more  intensive  drive  to  gain  additional  private  sponsorship  is  now 
considered  an  essential  element  in  the  role  of  the  NGBs  interviewed,  and  is  arguably 
symptomatic of  other NGBs within UK sport.   However,  Steen-Johnsen & Vidar Hanstad 
(2008) identified this as creating a dilution of purpose within the NGBs, who have little skill, 
ability or inclination to engage with the private sector because it distorts the NGBs aims and 
objectives and distracts them from their main purpose of representing and governing their 
sport.
Controlling the NGBs
The  concept  of  control  as  a  function  of  management  through  their  relationship  with 
UKSport, was a key theme identified within the analysis of the interview data.  For example, 
as a result of the drive to professionalise the NGBs they have had to become more business-
like (private sector ethos) in their approach to managing their organisations by showing 
higher levels of accountability, particularly as the findings indicate they are arguably moving 
away from their amateur footing to one where the professional holds sway:-
“We needed to show UKSport that we were not only accountable for the  
money  they  gave  us,  but  we  also  needed  to  show  that  we  ran  our  
organisation in a professional manner.  The board committee needed to  
change and  be  put  on  a  more  professional  footing.   That  is  why  we  
recruited Alex Newton (performance director) to show UKSport we were 
serious about winning medals, and showing a return on their investment.  
Within this role, we wanted the new performance director to move our  
athletes away from an amateur footing to a more professional, business  
like mentality”
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One of the key conclusions of this research is that the hierarchical  chain of power from 
government down to NGBs has effectively strait-jacketed the NGBs into delivering a narrow, 
Olympic-driven sports policy to meet government set targets.  This restricts the NGBs in 
terms of the time they have for other activities and may lead to the sports’ decline.  Indeed, 
Laws (2008)  found that  as  NGBs  become more  reliant  on  professional  staff,  volunteers 
(coaches,  club  officials)  are  bypassed  during  the  making  of  key  decisions  and  as  a 
consequence leave the NGBs.  This in turn creates a knowledge ‘vacuum’ with a lack of 
people in the NGB with intimate knowledge of the sport discipline (Thibault et al, 2004; Grix, 
2009).  This has begun to happen in the NGBs researched:-
“The organisation was not run by professionals, so a key issue was to try  
and ‘remove’  the amateurs  that held sway.   Without  their  removal  it  
would have been almost impossible for us to adopt a more professional  
footing – we had to start to think more like a business”
Spear (2004) identifies UKSport's external drive towards professionalisation of the NGBs as 
tilting power towards the managers, out of the hands of stakeholders.  Spear (2004) goes on 
to  state  that   if  there  is  a  concentration of  professional  staff  (paid),  volunteers  will  be 
ignored because the professional organisations “tend to ignore non-financial motivations 
such as common values, shared benefits and  trust due to performance measures placed on 
them.” (p.50).  Walters, Tacon & Trenberth (2010) support this viewpoint by arguing that 
NGBs need to become much better at identification of their stakeholders and " should bring 
key stakeholders  to  the board/committee to improve stakeholder  representation"  (p.6). 
With UKSport directing NGBs to act in a performance, professionally orientated manner, 
there is little incentive to engage in this process and stakeholders will probably continue to 
be marginalised.
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Conclusion
The key conclusion drawn from the research conducted is that the ‘no compromise’ funding 
system creates a power relationship between UKSport and the NGBs, where UKSport are 
effectively controlling the NGBs so that they deliver a narrow, Olympic-driven programme to 
meet  targets.   This  in  turn alienates  stakeholders  such as  volunteers,  which means  the 
professional staff have little time and resources to address the factors behind the sport’s 
general decline because of the focus on elite athletes.  It also becomes apparent that the 
NGBs cannot be more like ‘businesses’ and how they are managed should be addressed, if 
they do not want to experience negative consequences.  The management of the NGBs and 
UKSport should move away from the narrow focus of short-term medal targets on which 
UKSport judge the performance of the NGBs, to a management and funding regime that has 
the  long-term development  of  the  sport  at  its  heart  and  focuses  on  investment  future 
winners of medals.
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